







 Notwithstanding its clear connection with some central aspects of the pure 
theory of law, legal interpretation has a secondary role in the writtings of Hans 
Kelsen; in fact, it is controversial if he develops a theory of legal interpretation at 
all1. He certeinly does not in an usual way, that is, as a province of the general 
theory of law referred to the different methods or arguments of interpretation, 
their logical structure or presuppositions2. Kelsen’s thesis on legal interpretation 
can be better understood as a critic of the traditional conception –represented by 
the Begriffsjurisprudenz	or L’École	de	 l’exégèse– according to which the one right 
answer is to be reached through interpretation3. On the other hand, he also 
explicitly rejects the decisionism of the Freirechtschule	 or the American	 legal	
realism. 
 Kelsen’s basic ideas on legal interpertation are, on the one hand, its 
characterisation as a hybrid with both cognitive and volitive elements, due to the 
partial indeterminacy of law; and, on the other hand, the relationship between 
legal interpretation and the structural properties of the legal system, i. e., the 
dynamic principle and the stepped construction of legal order. It is, precisely, 
because of this connection with the dynamic conception and the hierarchical 
structure of legal systems –both features that the pure theory of law never 
abandones– that the theory of legal interpretation is one of the issues that has 
suffered less modifications, if any, in the context of Kelsen’s works4. In any case –as 
the periodization question seems unavoidable5– we could speak of an evolution, 
not in the main thesis on legal interpretation, but in the comprehension of the 
consecuences that the volitive or decisionist element would project in the overall 
construction, which deeply determines the evolution of Kelsen’s thought6. 
 
1 According to Stanley Paulson, Kelsen actually has no theory of legal interpretation (Paulson, 
1990a: 137). In the other hand, the theoretical frame of the pure theory of law itself, that is, the 
positive law as object of knowledge, restricts the development of such a theory (Mayer, 2001: 98). 
2 Luzzati (1995: 88); Mayer (2001: 95-6). 
3 Walter (1983: 188). Kelsen’s rejection of the traditinal doctrine has not only a theoretical basis, as 
this doctrine ignore the volitive element that operates in every act of adjudication, but also 
ideological, as it hides this element, pretending that every act of adjudication has a cognitive nature. 
4 Luzzati (1990: 123); also, Bulygin (1995: 12) and Ruiz Manero (1990: 94). Chiassoni distinguishes 
two periods in Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation: the first one, named naive	dualism, begins in 
1911, with the Hauptprobleme, and extends up to 1934, when the second period, named critic 
dualism, begins. Then, his oppinion is similar to that of Luzzati, Bulygin or Ruiz Manero. 
5 See, among others, the debates of stanley Paulson with Mario Losano (vid. Paulson, 1985; 1990a; 
1990b; 1990c y Losano, 1985; 1990) and, more recently with Carsten Heidemann (vid. Paulson, 
1998; 1999 y Heidemann, 1997; 1999). 
6 Paulson (1990a: 140). However, Paulson differentiates three periods within Kelsen’s theory of 
legal interpretation: a first one, that extends from 1911 to 1934; a second one, characterized by the 
distinction between volitive and cognitive elements in legal interpreteation, due to the partial 
indetermination of law, that is up to the 50’s; and a third and last period, in which the balance 
between cognition and will desappears (Paulson, 1990c: 178-80). 
 This connection with the structural aspects of the pure theory of law also 
expains that some ideas on legal interpretation can be traced back to early texts, as 
the Allgemeinestaatslehere	 of 1925, in which Kelsen presents a complete and 
systematic exposition of the dynamic conception of legal system. In questioning 
the classical distinction between legis	latio and legis	executio as typical functions of 
two different state authorities, those of legisaltive and judicial, respectively7, 
Kelsen is diminishin the importance of the opposition between creation and 
application of the law8. In this period of Kelsen’s thought, the idea of 
indetermination of law is barely developed, though it is already implicit in some 
way. According to the hierarchical structure of the legal system law creation is a 
process of determination in which each step, that is, each act carried out by a state 
authority is an act of application and, simultaneously, an act of creation of law, due 
to the partial indetermination of law. If we accept that every act of application of 
law is, at the same time, an act of creation of law, it seems that the presence of 
volitive elements in legal interpretation is also to be admited.   
 Since its formulation in the writings of 19349, Kelsen’s thesis on legal 
interpretation have remained unchanged (and are well known): 
 
1) “Interpretation is an intellectual activity that accompanies the law-
creating process as it moves from a higher level of the hierarchical 
structure to the lower level governed by this higher level”10. 
2) “In governing the creation of the lower-level norm, the higher-level 
norm determinates not only the process whereby the lower-level norm 
is created, but possibly the content of the norm to be created as well”11. 
3) “This determination, however, is never complete”12.  
4) “Indeterminacy can be directly intended, that is, can be part of the 
intention of the authority issuing the higher-level norm”13; or 
indeterminacy “can also be the unintended consequence of properties of 
the norm to be applied by the act in question”14. 
5) Because of the indeterminacy, “the norm to be applied is simply a frame 
within wich various possibilities for application are given, and every act 
that stays within this frame, in some possible sense filling it in, is in 
conformity with the norm”15. 
6) “From the standpoint of the positive law, however, there is no criterion 
on the basis of which one of the posibilities given within the frame of the 
norm to be applied could be favoured over the other possibilities (…) 
there is simply no method according to which only one of the several 
readings of a norm could be distinguished as ‘correct’”16. 
 
7 And, therefore, the classical doctrine of the separation of powers (Kelsen, 1925: §37). 
8 Kelsen (1925: §33). 
9 Kelsen (1934a), that reproduces what had been advanced in “Zur Theorie der Interpretation” 
(Kelsen, 1934b). 
10 Kelsen (1934a: 77). 
11 Kelsen (1934a: 78). 
12	Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kelsen (1934a: 79). 
15 Kelsen (1934a: 80). 
16 Kelsen (1934a: 81). 
7) “The necessity of an ‘interpretation’ arises precisely because the norm to 
be applied –or the system of norms– leaves open various possibilities, 
which is really to say that neither the norm nor the system of norms 
provides a decision (…). This decision (…) is left instead to a future act of 
norm creation”17. 
8) “[I]t is a function of will to arrive at the individual norm [lower-level 
norm] in the process of applying a statute, provided that the frame of the 
general norm [higher-level norm] is filled in thereby”18. 
9) As a corolary, two uses of ‘interpretation’ must be distinguished. The 
first one refers to a process of identification of all possible meanings of a 
statement, that is to say, the frame defined by the legal norm; this is the 
scientific	interpretation. The second one refers to the decision of a legal 
authority that makes one of the possible meanings of the norm to 
become binding; this is the authentic interpretation. The first one is a 
pure cognitive activity; the second one is an act of creation of law 
according to the dynamic principle. 
 
 Kelsen claims to position himself halfway between the thesis of the one 
right answer, that conceives interpretation as an act of pure knowledge, on the one 
hand, and radical skepticism, that defend the volitive nature of law application, on 
the other hand; in other words, between cognitivism and decisionism. Legal 
(authentic) interpretation comprehends, according to Kelsen, both, cognitive and 
volitive elements: the identification of the frame defined by the higher-level norm, 
that partially determines the act of application / creation of law, and the decision of 
one of the possible interpretations within the frame in which the higher-level 
norm can be concretized. This balance, nevertheless, does not maintains, 
destabilizing to the decisionist side, when connecting Kelsen’s ideas on legal 
interpretation with other aspects of his theory. 
 It is the case of legal science. As Paulson has pointed, the claim to present 
scientific interpretation as the discovery of all, or at least, the greatest number of 
possible meanings of a normative statement (norm), is not only an utopian 
proyect, as his own commentar of the United Nations Charter shows19; as they all 
are legally equivalent, general norms lack of any capability of prediction or have it 
very limited from the point of view of legal science20. Considering that higher-level 
norms state a frame of possible meanings, that is, a multiplicity of possible lower-
level norms, what does it mean that legal science describe valid norms? According 
to the later, the statements of legal science would be formulated as follows: “The 
(higher-level) norm N comprehends the norm N1 according to the meaning A; the 
norm N2 according to the meaning B; the norm N3 according to the meaning C, …”21. 
 
17 Kelsen (1934a: 82). 
18 Kelsen (1934a: 83). 
19 Paulson (1990a: 146). 
20 Paulson (1990a: 150) 
21 Guastini (1989: 123). Guastini has shown up the general incompatibility of Kelsen’s theory of 
legal science and his theory of legal interpreattion. First of all, Kelsen do not even mention the 
problem of interpretation when addressing the question of legal science. Nevertheless –points out 
Guastini– the later presupposes the former, “since the identification and description of norms 
stricto	 sensu requires interpretation (at least “pragmatic” interpretation in view of deciding 
whether a given sentence expresses either a norm or a statement)” (Guastini, 1995: 109). In second 
place, Kelsen do not distinguishes between normative statements (sentence) and norms (meaning); 
Legal science statements would be just a list or an enumeration of possibilities, not 
even of probabilities. The practical relevance of legal science is still more 
attenuated if we consider its distance from legal praxis, as Kelsen admits that an 
authentic interpretation that goes beyond the limits –the frame– stablished by the 
scientific interpretation can be a valid act of application / creation of law22. 
 Other problems raise with other parts of Kelsen theory. Due to his 
skepticism regarding legal methods of interpretation –what is not, but an 
extension of his ethical eskepticism– Kelsen has been described as irrationalist, 
given that the equivalence among these methods of interpretation from the point 
of view of positive law prevent from rational justifying the arrival to a final 
decision. Nonetheless, it seems to me that this accusation does not alter in essence 
Kelsen’s mid position regarding legal interpretation. It is in relation to the problem 
of irregular norms that the solutions propposed by Kelsen seems to bring his 
theory closer to an extreme decisionism, moving him away of the mid point 
irretrievably.  
 Yet, there are some elements that allows a less irrationlist reading of 
Kelsen’s ideas. In what follows I will analize two aspects of his thesis on legal 





 Kelsen maintains that every legal act that applies a norm is only partially 
determined by that norm, therefore, every act of norm application implies a 
moment of discretion. This indeterminacy can be intended or not. In the first case, 
indeterminacy is “part of the intention of the authority issuing the higher-level 
norm”23. Kelsen provides with two examples. The first one refers to a health law 
that prescribes that “upon outbreak of an epidemic the residents of the affected 
city are to take certain precautions to prevent the disease from spreading”. In this 
case, “administrative agencies are empowered to determine these precautions in 
various ways depending on the various diseases”24. The second one is that of a 
criminal law that “provides for a fine or a gaol sentence for a specified delict”, 
where “the judge is left both todecide in favour of ine sanction or the other and to 
 
in Guastini’s opinion, scientific interpretation enumerates the posible meanings of normative 
statements; the different norms conteined in theses statements: norms are the result, not the object 
of interpretation; and, in any case, this list cannot be a deontic statement, as Kelsen claims 
(Guastini, 1995: 110-1), unless they are just a mere repetition of norms; “actual juristic deontic 
sentences cannot be understood as scientific statements. They can only be understood as 
proporsals of just one interpretation among the variety of interpretations which a norm-
formulation allows for” (Guastini, 1995: 111); in such a case, scientific interpretation would not be 
a cognitive activity, but political. Other critical considerations point in the same direction: 
according to Kelsen, the statements through which legal science expresses itself are not mere 
descriptive statements, but, given the cognitive function of legal science, they are neither 
prescriptive statements, but statements of a third class, that is, the “descriptive ought statements”. 
In Ruiz Manero’s opinion, these type of statements are not distinguishable of mere prescriptions, 
therefore Kelsen is not succesfull in construing this category (Ruiz Manero, 1990: 56).   
22 Chiassoni (1990: 72). 
23 Kelsen (1934: 78). 
24 Kelsen (1934: 78-9). 
determine its severity, for whcich determination an upper and a lower limit may 
be established in the statute itself”25. 
 On the other hand, unintended indeterminacy is a consequence of the 
properties of the norm to be applied. Kelsen mentions three sources of unintended 
indeterminacy: “First of all, there is the ambiguity of a word or a phrase used in 
expressing the norm; the linguistic sense of the norm is not univocal, and whoever 
is going to apply the norm is faced with several possibilities. The same situation 
exists where the organ applying the norm believes that a discrepancy between the 
linguistic expression of the norm and the will of the norm-issuing authority can be 
assumed. (…) Finally, indeterminacy of the prescribed legal act can result from the 
fact that two norms purporting to be simultaneously valid –both contained, say, in 
one and the same statute– contradict one another wholly or in part”26. 
 There is another source os indeterminacy that has nothing to do with the 
intention of the authority issuing the higher-level norm or the properties of the 
norm, but with legal conventions (methods, arguments) on interpretation. As 
Kelsen himself points out, “[t]he different methods of interpretation may establish 
different meanings of one and the same provision. Sometimes, even one and the 
same method, especially the so-called grammatical interpretation, leads to 
contradictory results”27. This indeterminacy, say, comes not from above. 
 The notion of indeterminacy suffers itself from ambiguity, being able of, at 
least, two interpretations. The first one is a linguistic	 interpretation of 
indeterminacy; according to this, indeterminacy is a property of language and, 
therfore, a linguistic property of norms (i). The second one is a legal	interpretation 
of indeterminacy; according to this, the notion of indeterminacy refers to the 
structural properties of legal systems, that is, hierarchy and dynamicity; for this 
interpretation indeterminacy does not refer to norms, but to acts of application / 
creation of norms carried out by the authorities (ii). 
 
 (i) If the notion of indeterminacy is interpreted in a linguistic sense, Kelsen 
thesis is not sufficiently founded. As Ruiz Manero has pointed out, Kelsen thesis 
implies the following: “first, that norms to be applied always	have (that is, all	of 
them and in every case of application) a indeterminacy margin; second, that it is 
not possible, in	any	case, to avoid that margin by means of second	level	norms, that 
is, by means of directives on interpretation of first level norms”28. Leaving aside 
intentional indeterminacy29 (wanted by the authority that issue the norm that 
expressly confers the lower authority certain power of decision), the list of sources 
that generate unintentional indeterminacy is not exhaustive, so that “asuming the 
existence of cases in which there can be more than one answer within the set of 
applicable norms, does not mean that there are also cases for which there is only 
one solution within the set of applicable norms”30. In short, according to this critic, 
 
25 Kelsen (1934: 79). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Kelsen (1949: xiii). 
28 Ruiz Manero (1990: 27). 
29 The two examples of intentional indeterminacy provided by Kelsen make no reference –in 
contrast to Hart– to the possibility that indeterminacy may be obtained through language 
properties, be it ambiguity or vagueness (Lifante, 1999: 68). Nonetheless, there are no reasons to 
think that Kelsen excludes this source of intentional indeterminacy. 
30 Ruiz Manero (1990: 28). 
Kelsen is not fully aware of the fact that indeterminacy is a contingent property of 
legal norms. 
 But, Kelsen’s failure in founding the indeterminacy thesis does not mean 
that this is wrong. It could be argued –as Bulygin does– that there always exist 
some unavoidable vagueness degree, when particular facts are related to words31. 
In contrast to the former position, this second linguistic interpretation of the 
notion of indeterminacy presents indeterminacy as a necessary property of norms. 
According to this, Kelsen simply missed the target in justifying the thesis, but not 
in its heart. 
 
 (ii) The notion of indeterminacy can also be non linguistically interpreted. 
Based on Kelsen’s own texts, some authors32 have rejected that his thesis is to be 
understood as if there were no right answer in some cases or the application of 
norms is never a deductive operation. So Kelsen: 
 
 “Interpreting a statute, then, leads not necessarily to a single decision as the only 
correct decision, but possibly to a number of decisions, all of them of equal standing 
(measured solely against the norm to be applied), even if only a single one of them 
becomes, in the act of the judicial decision, positive law”33. 
 
 The fact that there is not necesarily a single decision do not exclude that 
there is one; at the same time, that interpretation leads possibly to a number of 
decisions does not mean that this necessarily so. We cannot conclude from 
Kelsen’s text that he rejects the existence of clear cases; thus, the notion of 
indeterminacy do not always make reference to the fact that a norm is suitable of 
various interpretations. In other words, indeterminacy do not refer exclusively to a 
linguistic property of norms, but to a distinctive feature of legal systems. Mayer 
points out in this direction when affirming that it is necessary to clearly distinguish  
indeterminacy between a lower normative level and a higher normative level, on 
the one hand, and indeterminacy in the application of a general norm, suitable of 
more than a single interpretation34; the first one is a legal question regarding the 
hierarchical structure of legal systems and the dynamic principle ruling its 
functioning, the second one is a linguistic question regarding the open texture of 
ordinary language, that is, the existence of easy (or paradigmatic) and hard cases 
in the use of concepts. Acording to this interpretation, the kelsenian notion of 
indeterminacy has to do with the first meaning. 
 Luzzati has developed a more sofisticated approach. According to him, 
indeterminacy (Unbestimmtkeit) is obviously a distinctive feature of legal systems 
 
31 Though admiting Kelsen’s justificatory deficits, Bulygin, nevertheless, finds quite sound the 
indeterminacy thesis: “The reason why the individual norm created by the judge is never 
completely determined by general norms is that general norms are always expressed in a language 
that contains general terms (predicates), whereas the judge has to decide a particular case; so his 
problem is the subsuntion of certain particular facts under the predicates contained in the legal 
rules (general norms)” (Bulygin, 1995: 14). See also Paulson (1990a: 143-4) and Caytas (2012: 14). 
32 Walter (1983: 190-1); Mayer (2001: 100-1). According to Walter, Kelsen vehement attacks 
against the traditional doctrin of the one right answer have lead to the wrong conclusion of 
considering hima as a decisionist; a conclusion –says Walter– that cannot be obtained from Kelsen 
own texts. As we will see, those who arrive to this conclusion have more convincing arguments 
than this one.  
33 Kelsen (1934: 80). 
34 Mayer (2001: 102-3). 
and not a semantic or linguistic notion35. As it is well known, the existence of a 
norm depends on it being created by an act of a legal authority in accordance with 
a higher-level norm. The point here is not as much the necessity of the normative 
act, but the fact that the higher-level norm is determined through this act. 
Therefore, indeterminacy has to do with the discretion of legal authorities when 
deciding how to apply the higher-level norm. Luzzati’s approach is based on the 
following argments. First of all, Kelsen do not consider indeterminacy a property of 
legal norms, but of the acts that apply the law, hence indeterminacy is not 
comparable to vagueness (though it could be a consequence of it in some cases) 
and it is of legal nature36. Secondly, Kelsen maintains an unitary concept of 
indeterminacy refering to the margin of discretion (which diminishes as we 
descend to the lower levels of the legal system) of every act of application / 
creation of law37. Finally, the distinction between intentional and non-intentional 
indeterminacy (that is, between normative and factual indeterminacy), seems to 
confirm that Kelsen refered to discretion and not to vagueness as intentional 
indeterminacy means the explicit empowerment of certain authorities with a 
margin of decision that is not a consequence of the linguistic properties of norms. 
On the other hand, even if it largely dependes on language, non-intentional 
indeterminacy do not always have a linguistic nature, as Kelsen’s enumeration of 
possible sources of this kind of indeterminacy shows38.  
 In my opinion, this approach is succesful showing that the kelseninan 
notion of indeterminacy is a broader notion than that of open texture or 
vagueness, but defective in constructing a unitary notion of indeterminacy39. If 
identified with discretion, the notion of indeterminacy is such an abstract concept 
that it would refer to quite different things such as: an express delegation of a 
power of decision; a factual delegation implicit in linguistic indeterminacy; not to 
follow the letter of the norm as the interpreter doubts that the will of the authority 
that issued the norm is accurately reflected in the text; or even the necessity of a 
decision, that is, a normative act of application / creation of which depends the 
validity (existence) of the norm. Certainly, all these cases can be described in some 
sense as discretion, but there are relevant differences that would justify a greater 
precision, specifically between those cases in which the lower authority can 
determine the content of the norm and those in which this authority can only 
decide if or when it carries out the normative act that creates the (lower) norm, 
but lacks any margin of decision regarding the content of the norm. In the later 
case, we can only speak of indeterminacy in a very broad and, often, trivial sense. 
This attempt to reconstruct an unitary notion of indeterminacy is easy to 
understand if we connect, first, the dynamic principle, acording to which every 
norm is contained (but at the same time is still indetermined) in a higher-level 
norm, and therefore a normative act of creation by the empowered authority is 
 
35 Luzzati (1990: 125).  
36 Luzzati (1990: 130). 
37 Luzzati (1990: 133). 
38 Luzzati (1990: 136). In fact, language in intentional indeterminacy examples is not vague; on the 
contrary, it is an express delegatoin of a power of decision whose terms are clearly stablished. This 
is not the case of legal standars, as the “do not expressely delegate power to the courts to decide 
freely the cases that are submited to them, but reflect social and ethical rules. Moreover, vague 
rules confer a merely implicit and factual discretion, not a discretion explicitly recogniced by law” 
(Luzzati, 1990: 136). 
39 Vid. Lifante (1999: 77-8). 
needed for it to be valid, that is to say, for that norm to exist; and second, Kelsen’s 
skepticism about the methods of interpretation and legal argumentation. It is not 
difficult to obtain an image of legal dinamics as a sequence of normative acts of 
creation that always and in every case present a margin of discretion and lack of 
any rational criteria for decision and control40. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the 
notion persists, as there are two concepts of discretion that should be 
distinguished, that refering to the margin of decision and that refering to the 
empowerment to decide. 
 Anyway, and accepting that Kelsen could have been more precise here, no 
argument endangers his mid-position in the range of theories of legal 





a) Formal validity and material validity. 
 
 According to the dynamic principle, a norm is valid if the act that creates it 
is in accordance with the provision of a higher-level norm. As the later 
determinates not only the process whereby the lower-level norm is created, but 
possibly the content of the norm to be created as well formal	 (refering to the 
authority and the procedure) and material	 (refering to content) conditions of 
validity must be differenciated. 
 Regarding material validity, a norm is in accordance with the higher-level 
norm if its content circunscribes to the set of possibilities of execution or 
application described by the later. It is in this sense that Kelsen defines the norm 
as a “frame” (Rahmen)41. But, if any, which are the boundaries of this frame? The 
metaphor of the frame expresses the rejection to cognitivist theories of legal 
interpretation that support the one right answer thesis, showing that every 
normative act of aplication contains a moment of discretion (thesis of 
indeterminacy), as there is always a plurality of possible answers. Nonetheless, the 
idea of the frame goes further: independently of the practical difficulties involved 
in determining the boundaries of the frame, the very notion of material validity of 
a norm rest on the presupposition that there is a set of meanings that fit into the 
boundaries of the frame42; that is, the idea of the frame means that interpretation 
of the higher-level norm is subject to criteria of correction. Only when the 
interpretation of a legal authority stays within the frame defined by the higher-
level norm, can it be said to be a normative act of application. The frame is, 
therefore, the cognitive element of interpretation.  
 Inmediately, a connection between the idea of the frame and legal sicence 
arises. Leaving aside the margins of discretion explicitly established by higher-
level norms (intentional indeterminacy), that also define the boundaries of the 
frame, it seems clear that the frame is not only defined by the general linguistic 
uses, but also by all those interpretations based on the application of current 
interpretative conventions in the legal community. Precisely, it is the identification 
of this multiplicity of meanings what results from scientific interpretation. 
 
40 Lifante (1999: 78). 
41 Kelsen (1934a: 80). 
42 Paulson (1990a: 148). 
Nonetheless, Kelsen expressely admits that authentic interpretation can differ 
from scientific interpretation43. By this, two questions arises that undermine the 
cognitive element: first, the scarce relevance of legal science from the point of view 
of the pure theory of law (in contrast to sociological approaches); and, second and 
more signifcant, the fact that the authentic interpretation exceeds scientific 
interpretation is not due to the incompleteness of the later –something that con be 
only admited partialy or in particualr cases, but not as a general rule– but just to 
the will of legal authorities.   
 This volitive element is even clearer in the next text: 
 
 “By way of authentic interpretation, that is, the interpretation of a norm by the 
legal organ applying it, not only can one of the possibilities be realised that are brought out 
by the cognitive interpretation of the norm to be applied, but also a norm can be created 
that lies completely outside the frame represented by the norm to be applied”44. 
 
 Here, the reference to scientific interpretation is substituted by a more 
general reference to the cognitive interpretation. This is an important shift as it 
refers not to the subject of interpretation, but to the very nature of the act. The 
emphasis lays not in the dissociation of legal science and legal praxis, but in the 
dissociation of the cognitive element that logicaly preceeds the volitive elements in 
authentic intepretation. 
 The cognitive element consist in the set of objective meanings given to the 
interpreter –as it is the object of an act of knowledge, not an act of will– on the 
basis on currently accepted interpretative conventions, such as rules of use of 
(ordinary) language, legal methods, equity or any other convention that rules legal 
interpretation. When an authority produces a norm exceeding the frame defined 
by the higher-level norm, it is ignoring the set of objective meanings deriving from 
these rules. In other words, a normative act do not fulfill material conditions of 
validity when this act cannot objectively be interpreted as observing of any of 
these interpretative conventions. To be outside the frame means to ignore any 
rule, principle or standard, in short, interpretative convention identifiable as such; 
it means to ignore meaning normativity on which material justification of a 
normative act of creation of law rests. We would say then that the normative act is 
a pure act of will, that is, an act of mere creation, but not an act of application of 
law. 
 Nevertheless, in providing an answer to the problem of the conflict of 
norms of different hierarchical level (irregular norms), Kelsen admits that 
conformity to content of the higher-level norm, that is, to stay within the frame 
defined by that norm, is neither sufficient nor necessary condition for the validity 
of the lower-level norm. Does this mean the irrelevance of what has been said thus 
far?  This conclusion seems to me to be unsound, though not completely 
unjustified. However, I find a promising line of argument in a non reductionist 
interpretation of the concepts of correctness and validity and a funtional (non 
ontological) interpretation of the content relation between norms of different 
hierarchical levels. In what follows I will analyse the problem of irregular norms 
and its consequences for the kelsenian theory. In the next section I will try a 
 
43 “Authentic interpretation may even attribute to a legal norm a meaning which a non-authentic 
interpretation could never dare to maintain. That is to say, by authentic interpretation a legal norm 
may be replaced by another norm of totally different content” (Kelsen, 1949: xv). 
44 Kelsen (1960: 354). 





 It is a fact that there are general and individual norms whose content is not 
in accordance with a higher-level norm (unconstitutional statute, illegal regulation, 
judicial decisions or administrative acts contrary to statute or regulation), but are 
valid, according to positive law. These anomalous aspects of legal reality, that 
affect both, validity of norms (that cannot be explained anymore as the norm 
creation in accordance with the provisions established by the higher-level norm) 
and coherence of legal systems (threatened by the existence of two contradictory 
norms), are difficult to accommodate into the internal logic of the kelsenian model 
of legal system45. Kelsen’s answer –the so-called tacit alternative clause doctrine– 
is well known and a very controversial one: 
 
 “If , for example, an unconstituional statute is possible –that is, a valid statute that 
either in the manner of its creation or in its content fails to conform to the provisions of the 
prevailing constitution– this can only be interpreted in one way: the constitution aims not 
only for the validity of the constitutional statute, but also (in some sense) for the validity of 
the ‘unconstitutional’ statute. Otherwise one could no speak of the ‘validity’ of the latter at 
all. That the constitution does aim for the validity of the so-called unconstitutional statute 
is shown in the fact that it prescribes not only that statutes should be created in a certain 
way and have (or not have) a certain content, but also that if a statute was created other 
than in the prescribed way or has other than the prescribed content, it is not to be regarded 
as null and void, but is to be valid until it is invalidated by the designed authority –say, a 
constitutional court– in a procedure governed by the constitution”46. 
 
 And follows: 
 
  “The meaning of the higher-level norm that provides for the creation and the 
content of a lower-level norm cannot be comprehended without taking account of the 
further provision made by the higher-level norm for the case in which its first provision is 
violated. Thus, the determination of the lower-level norm by the higher-level norm has the 
character of an alternative provision here (…). If the individual norm corresponds to the 
first of the alternatives, it is complete, adequate, on the mark; if it corresponds to the 
second of the alterntives, it is inferior, falling short of the mark, that is, it can be overturned 
owing to the claim of its deficiency”47. 
 
 With an answer of this kind, both problems seem to be solve at once: the 
lower-level norm whose content do not correspond to what is explicitely provided 
by the higher-level norm is not an unlawful norm, but an objectively valid norm 
according to the alternative implicit provision; the same reason stands for 
disolving the conflict –logical contradiction– between norms. Thus, the very 
concept of “unlawful norm” is alien to Kelsen’s view: according to the positive law 
 
45 For some authors this is a unsurmountable problem; v.g. Weyland: “Kelsen often pursued 
irreconcilable aims. This is particularly true of his treatament of conflicts of norms at different 
levels of the hierarchy, which constitutes one of the most puzzling and controversial aspects od his 
theory. The inconsistencies in this case arise from the incompatibility between his desire to 
construct a logically coherent model of legal systems and his attempt to fit into certain anomalous 
aspects of legal reality” (Weyland, 1986: 249).  
46 Kelsen (1934a: 72). 
47 Kelsen (1934a: 74). 
one cannot speak of “unconstitutional laws” or “unlawful final judicial decision” 
(when no more appeals are availible); an ab	 initio	 invalid norm is a non existent 
norm (a no-norm); there are only valid or invalidatable norms, that is, valid as long 
as the competent authority do not declare it void. This “declaration” –says Kelsen– 
has not a mere declarative, but a constitutive character48. Because of this 
constitutive character it cannot be dismissed that a legal authority declares invalid 
a norm that conforms with the higher-level norm. In short, a norm is valid (or 
invalid), if it has been declared valid or has not been declared void by the 
competent authority.  
 The formulation of a doctrine like that of the tacit alternative clause in the 
context of Hans Kelsen’s work has been explained in different ways. On the one 
hand, it has been said that it is a necesary element of Kelsen’s theory considering 
the neo-kantian epistemological presuppositions49. This doctrine has also been 
explained in pragmatic terms emphasizing the functional dimension of law: its 
contribution to social peace and certainty50. A third explanation is a conceptual 
one: according to Bulygin, this is based in the ambiguity of the concept of validity51. 
With “validity” Kelsen describe three different properties of legal norms: the norm 
creation according to the provisions of a higher-level norm (also identified with 
membership of the norm to the legal system); the specific existence of the norm; 
and, finally, the binding	character of the norm. Due to this ambiguity all meanings 
of validity are considered to be co-extensive and the problem of invalid norms 
appears as a contradiction: norms that do not conform to the provisions of a 
higher-level norm, but, at the same time, binding norms as long as the competent 
authority do not declare it invalid. As he did not differentiate between these two 
different concepts of validity, the way of explaining the binding character of these 
norms, and in addition solve the logical contradiction, is to maintain against to all 
appearances the conformity of these norms with higher-level norms by means of 
the alternative provision. The mistake lays in that a norm that do not belong to the 
legal system can be binding, as is is the case of foreign law or derogated norms52.  
 The tacit alternative clause doctrine has, at least apparently, devastating 
consequences for Kelsen’s theory53. Firstly, it “deprives all general norms of their 
normative character, for they become tautologous: whatever the course of action 
chosen by the judge, it always conforms to the general norm applied, so a general 
norm cannot –for reasons of logic alone– be violated or infringed”54. Secondly, and 
as a consequence of the former, legal norms become trivial, for normative acts 
creating general or individual norms are not determined in their content by 
higher-level norms. And, finally, the distinction between “invalidatable norms” and 
“non existing norms” is completely obscured, for the implicit and almost unlimited 
openness of the alternative provision do not allows to consider the cases of non 
existing norms as cases not foreseen by law, as there is nothing that prevents from 
considering those cases comprehended in the alternative provision. Anyhow, for 
these reasons, critics consider that the whole theory of the legal system as a 
 
48 Kelsen (1960: 277). 
49 Luzzati (1995: 98). 
50 García Amado (1996: 231 y ss.). 
51 Bulygin (1991: 363). 
52 Bulygin (1995: 18-9). 
53 Vid. Nino (1985: 32 y ss.); Weyland (1986: 256); Ruiz Manero (1990: 67); Bulygin (1995: 17). 
54 Bulygin (1995: 17). 
dynamic normative system, as well as the idea of law as a technique for social 
order, collapse, and, al the same time, that Kelsen fall into an extreme 





 Considering what has been said up to here, the relations between norm 
content and norm validity are as follows: 
 
1) As norms are the meaning of an act of will, the mere correspondence 
with the provisions of a higher-level norm is not a sufficient condition 
for its validity; a normative act of application / creation of the higher-
level norm is necessary for the lower-level norm to be valid, that is to 
say, to exist. 
2) Owing to the tacit alternative clause doctrine, validity is not a contingent 
property of norms, but an a	 priori56, thus correspondence of content 
 
55 Ruiz Manero (1990: 65), Bulygin (1995: 17). Taking into consideration these consequences, some 
authors have proposed different solutions that could fit in Kelsen’s theory. Following the 
disambiguation of the concept of validity made by Bulygin, Nino maintains that it is possible invalid 
norms to be binding. Unlike Kelsen, Nino’s solution is characterized by the following elements: 1) 
the norms that “grant validity to the unconstitutional or illegal enactments do not authorize	those 
enactments –which is what created some paradoxical implications– but merely declare that there is 
an obligation to apply and to observe the resulting statute”; 2) “these norms are not necessary	
components of every legal system. They are only positive and contingent parts of some systems, 
though generally the have not been explicitly enacted but are rather generated in a tacit and 
customary way”; and, 3) “norms which oblige the application of illegal enactments generally 
discriminate between laws, contrary to Kelsen’s thesis. In adition to negative conditions like that of 
not being declared unconstitutional by the corresponding court, the norm in question must satisfy a 
certain positive condition. I think that the implicit positive condition which is generally required is 
quite vague but nevertheless real and operative: the norm in question should enjoy a certain “color	
or	appearance	of	legality”” (Nino, 1995: 227).  
 Also Weyland tries to solve this problem otherways, close to the realist factual concept of 
validity: “Once we admit that Kelsen’s concept of the legal system cannot incorporate everything 
that has the appearance of being valid, prescriptive statements which do not satisfy Kelsen’s 
conditins of validity and yet have legal effects, must be deemed to be part of a wider notion of 
positive law and a different term must be used to describe them. I propose to call them ‘norms in 
force’ and define them as prescriptive statements which are deemed to be binding by legal officials 
because they have been issued by individuals who appear to be acting in the capacity of legal 
organs even though they have not complied with one or more norms that regulate their behaviour. 
Norms in force are more likely to be declared invalid or to fall into desuetude than valid norms. If 
notwithstanding their invalidity they become efficacious and the opinione	necessitatis required by 
Kelsen for the formation of customary law is present, they then become part of the legal system on 
the grounds that custom is a valid method of law creation” (Weyland, 1986: 268). 
 Actually, both alternatives rest on the distinction of the various concepts of validity that the 
kelsenian notion comprehends. Nino’s proporsal differentiate between validity as binding force and 
validity as conformity to the provisions of the higher-level norm (that is, as authorization and as 
membership to the legal system), in order to show that the first domain is wider than the second, as 
some norms oblige to obey and to apply invalid (not authorized) norms. While Weyland 
differentiate between validity as existence and validity as conformity to the provisions of the 
higher-level norm; her wider notion of positive law means nothing but the greater extension of the 
first domain which includes valid norms as well as those non valid norms that are deemed to be 
binding by legal officials due to their appearance of legality.  
56 Bulygin (1991: 365). 
with the higher-level norm is neither a necessary	 condition for the 
lower-level norm to be valid: as long as the norm is not declared invalid 
by the corresponding authority, it is valid. 
3) Even an obective valid norm, that is, a norm which content corresponds 
to the provisions of a higher-level norm, can be declared invalid by the 
corresponding authority. Then, the correspondence of content with the 
higher-level norm does not warrant	validity. 
4) Validity of general and individual norms depends on the decision of the 
corresponding authority. Being this a final decision, it is constitutive. 
 
 As we have already mentioned, not only an unwanted decisionism, but also 
the collapse of the whole theory of legal system (dynamic principle) and the idea of 
law as a technique for social order obtains from all this. This outlook seems to 
displace legal interpretation to irrelevancy. Nevertheless, I think that a less 
catastrophic and less irrationalist (may be, more charitable also) reconstruction of 
Kelsen ideas is possible resting on his initial intuitions on legal interpretation. 
Firstly, the validity of a norm and the fact that it is a correct interpretation (not the 
correct) of the higher-level norm must be clearly distinguished; in other words, a 
non reductionist interpretation of the concept of validity must be made. And 
secondly, the relation of parcial (un)determinacy is to be understood not in an 
ontological, but a functional and pragmatic way.  
 Keslen’s solution to the problem of conflicts of norms at different 
hierarchical levels favors the factual upon the normative, by means of recognizing 
validity to unlawful norms. The alternative, that is, to deny legal status to those 
norms, is not viable from the point of view of the pure theory of law. In the other 
hand, there are good reasons for considering valid a norm that do not conform 
with the provisions of the higher-level norm. Social conflicts and controversies 
cannot be subject to permanent revision; a definitive solution in a reasonable 
period of time is a necessary condition for the law to fulfill its social function of 
contributing to social peace and certainty57. But, of course, this does not mean that 
any final decision, independently of its content, is correct (or a correct 
interpretation of the higher-level norm). The constitutive character of final 
decisions regarding the validity of norms should not obscure this point. Legal 
authorities have the last word, but are not infalible. As Bulygin says, these 
decisions “are not constitutive in the sense that they make empirical or normative 
sentence true (…) they are constitutive only in the sense that they constitute 
conditions for the application of other norms“58. In other words, the court’s 
opinion is a sufficient condition for the validity of a norm, but not a standard of 
correctness.  
 It is at this point where Kelsen’s ideas on legal interpretation play a relevant 
rol. The distinction between interpretations within the frame and interpretations 
beyond it, presuppose a standard of correctness that defines two non co-extensive 
domains from this particular perspective. On the contrary, as a result of the 
normative emptiness of legal validity through the tacit alternative clause, the  
domain of “legally valid” entities is potentially co-extensive to that of “factual” 
decisions of legal authorities, as any norm, general or individual, is valid, 
independently of its content, as long as the corresponding authority does not 
 
57 Bulygin (1995: 22); Luzzati (1995: 96). 
58 Bulygin (1995: 24). 
declare it void. This asymetry between legal correctness and legal validity is 
justified by law social functions, that is, social peace and legal certainty, but it is not 
necessary to reduce legal correctness to legal validity for the law to fulfill these 
functions. 
 As it has been said, the frame defined by the norm to be applied is a 
normative concept whose content depends on the interpretative conventions 
(methods, principles) of the legal community. According to these conventions not 
every interpretation falls within the frame. Indeed, they can lead to opposite 
interpretations –and in fact they do– owing to their potentially conflictive 
character. This just shows that two or more interpretations are correct from the 
point of view of the positive law, but, at the same time, that legal correctness does 
not mean correctness tout	court. Difficulties establishing the limits of the frame59, 
or the fact that these limits are the result of the argumentative strategies of the 
authorities or the parts in a legal process60 are not enough strong objections as to 
abandone the idea of normativity in legal interpretation. 
 Other objection could be addressed against its scope or amplitude, which is 
something clearly different to its vagueness. Indeed, as a standard of legal 
correctness, the frame is a negative	 and minimum	 criterion: it only determines 
which interpretations conform to the content of the higher-level norm, according 
to the interpretative conventions accepted by the legal community. But, limited as 
it is, conformity to the content of the higher-level norm represents the only 
standard of correction and, therefore, the cognitive element in legal intepretation.    
 The question of norm content has been obscured by Kelsen himself when 
recognizing legal relevance just to the normative acts of application / creation of 
law. Nonetheless, the acts of authorities determining the validity of general or 
individual norms are, in part, judgements on the conformity of a norm to the 
content of the higher-level norm. This conformity is neither necessary nor 
sufficient condition for the validity of a norm, but non conformity to the higher-
level norm content is sufficient condition for it to be declared void. This declaration	
is constitutive regarding validity, but it is not regarding correctness.  
 Anyway, as a matter of fact, the deciding authority could ignore the frame, 
but not always and not in	any	case. This is the second part of my argument (and 
where Kelsen’s thought connects in some way with the hobbesian tradition): 
conformity to the content of the higher-level norm is a necessary condition for the 
efficacy the legal system as a whole. The content determination of a norm by the 
higher-level norm, as we already have seen, is not ontological	 in nature (as there 
exists norms that do not conform to that content), but –as García Amado has 
pointed out–	 falctual and functional. Legal systems could not fulfill their basic 
social function of assuring social order and peace –in short, the very possibility of 
society, which is law basic end in Kelsen’s thought– unless it is generally obeyed in 
all its hierarchical levels. The critics of the tacit alternative clause have seen this; 
but, why actual legal systems do not faill and collapse? The answer can only be 
that, mainly, legal authoryties conform to the provisions of the higher-level norms 
(what regarding content means that they stay within the significant frame). And 
 
59 Weyland (1986: 259). 
60 Duncan Kennedy maintains that the initial comprehension of case that determines the applicable 
norm to the facts can be modified by the practices the he names “strategic behaviour in 
interpretation”; that a case corresponds to one of the various possible interpretations within the 
frame is something that is determined by the interpreter (Kennedy, 2008: 155 ff.). 
this happens due to ideological	 –namely, what Ross called the “formal legal 
consciousness”– and sociological reasons, as the massive violation of what is 
socially recogniced as law would indeed leads to the collapse of legal system61. So, 
from the point of view of the legal system as a whole norm content is not irrelvant 
at all; general efficacy and, with that, the validity of legal systems, depend on that 
the normative acts of legal authorities are socially recogniced as subjected to law.   
 
61 García Amado (2006: 1206 ff.). See a larger development of this line of argument in García Amado 
(1996: 208 ff.). 
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